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Abstract 
Migrants commonly depart from Libya in overcrowded makeshift boats and embark on a 
journey which can last up to several weeks. Once in Italian waters they are intercepted by 
Italian border guards and transferred to the Lampedusa holding centre, where they are 
kept for between five and forty-five days. Numerous and consistent allegations of 
degrading treatment of third country nationals in detention in the holding centre, the 
difficulty in gaining access to the asylum and the large scale expulsions to Libya, brought 
Lampedusa to the attention of both European and international institutions. Despite the 
Italian government’s denial that any human right’s violations are taking place in the 
Lampedusa holding centre, the European parliament and the United Nation’s Human 
Rights Committee expressed concern about the conditions in the centre. This paper 
presents an overview of events and policies implemented in Lampedusa and Libya 
respectively, and outlines the contentions surrounding these policies. It uses material 
provided by the Italian authorities, European institutions and NGO’s and examines the 
schemes developed by the Italian and Libyan Governments to control the influx of 
irregular migrants and asylum seekers into Italy. The paper recommends that in guiding 
the EU’s partnership with its neighbour states in the field of asylum, borders and 
immigration transparency, accountability and legitimacy are key principles. 
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1 Introduction 
During the last year the temporary holding center for irregular migrants in Lampedusa, 
Italy’s southernmost island, has been repeatedly denounced for instances of procedural 
irregularities and alleged human rights violations. Lampedusa ‘temporary stay and 
assistance center’ (CPTA) came to a larger public attention in the Fall of 2004 when 
Italian authorities expelled more than thousand undocumented migrants to Libya on 
military and civil airplanes. Numerous and consistent allegations of degrading treatment 
of third-country nationals in detention in the holding center, the difficulty in gaining access 
to the asylum determination process and the large scale expulsions to Libya, brought 
Lampedusa to the attention of European and international institutions. The European 
Parliament (EP), the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and the United Nations’ 
Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) all called on Italy to respect asylum seekers and 
refugees’ right to international protection and to refrain from collective expulsions1 of 
asylum seekers and irregular migrants to Libya, a country that has no asylum system and 
has not a signed the Geneva Convention on Refugees.   
Positioned some two hundred kilometers south of Sicily and three hundred kilometers 
north of Libya, the island of Lampedusa became in 2004 the main point of arrival for 
boats carrying undocumented migrants and asylum seekers from Libya to Italy. A total of 
10 497 migrants, 412 of whom minors and 309 women transited through the Lampedusa 
CPTA in 2004.2 Migrants commonly depart from Libya in overcrowded makeshift boats 
and undertake a perilous sea journey which can last up to several weeks. Once in the 
Italian waters near Lampedusa, the boats are intercepted by Italian border guards and 
migrants transferred to the Lampedusa holding center. After staying in the holding center 
for a period that varies usually between five and forty-five days, the majority of migrants 
are transferred to CPTAs in Sicily or southern Italy and others are expelled to Libya. 
No official data is available on the countries of origin or reasons for migrating for 
migrants detained in the CPTA of Lampedusa. The UNHCR points to the presence of 
refugees and asylum seekers among those detained in the CPTA as well as among 
                                            
1 According to the European Court of Human Rights, collective expulsions are defined as “any measure by 
which foreigners are forced, due to their membership of a group, to leave a country, apart from cases in 
which this measure is adopted following and based on a reasonable and objective assessment of the 
specific situation of each of the individuals composing the group”.  
2 See European Parliament, Report from the LIBE Committee Delegation on the Visit to the Temporary 
Holding Centre in Lampedusa, EP/LIBE PV/581203EN, p.2. 
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those expelled to Libya. The authorities of Lampedusa CPTA refer to all third-country 
nationals held in the center as ‘illegal migrants’ and claim that there are nearly no asylum 
seekers present among migrants who depart from Libya. The authorities assert also that 
the majority of third-country nationals are economic migrants of Egyptian nationality.3 
The data gathered in Lampedusa by the Italian NGO ARCI and the Médecins sans 
Frontières identify instead Middle East (Iraq and Palestine), Maghreb, Horn of Africa 
(including Sudan) and Sub-Saharan Africa as migrants’ regions of origin. 4  More 
consistent data on migrants’ countries of origin and the nature of their journeys remain 
however unavailable in spite of the continuity of migratory flows from north Africa to the 
south of Italy since the end of the 1990s. 
The CPTA in Lampedusa is one of eleven existing holding centers, most of which 
located in the south of Italy. CPTAs are instruments for the detention of undocumented 
migrants pending expulsion and their function is to ensure effective functioning of 
expulsion procedures. Identified as complementary, detention and expulsion of 
undocumented migrants are crucial pillars of Italy’s politics towards irregular migration. In 
the effort to control undocumented migratory flows from Africa into its territory, Italy 
established collaboration on illegal migration with Libya, its southern Mediterranean 
neighbor. Initially signed in 2000 as a general agreement to fight terrorism, organized 
crime and illegal migration, in 2003 and 2004 Italian-Libyan partnership extended to 
include a readmission agreement, training for Libyan police officers and border guards, 
and Italy-funded detention and repatriation programs for irregular migrants in Libya. The 
aim of these schemes is to deter irregular migration, and by combating smuggling 
networks, prevent further migrants’ deaths at sea identified as responsibility of third 
parties that manage smuggling activities between Libya and Italy.  
This paper presents an overview of events and policies implemented in Lampedusa 
and Libya respectively and outlines the contentions surrounding these policies. Using the 
material provided by the Italian authorities, European institutions and the NGOs, the 
paper further examines the schemes developed by the Italian and Libyan Governments, 
the European Union and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) as main 
actors involved in implementing immigration-related programs and polices in Lampedusa 
and Libya. A methodological note is necessary here. The data available on measures 
regarding detention and deportations of irregular migrants and asylum seekers in 
                                            
3 Ibid., p.3. 
4 See ARCI, Il diario del presidio ARCI a Lampedusa, 2005a; ARCI, Lampedusa Watching, 2005b.  
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Lampedusa and Libya are often contradictory and incomplete. In case of Lampedusa, 
scarce information provided by Italian authorities’ was lately supplemented by data 
gathered by the European Parliament, the NGOs and journalists. When it comes to Libya, 
the content of agreements whether between the Italian and Libyan Governments or 
between the latter and the IOM remain undisclosed. Hence, rather than offering an 
exhaustive description of legislative acts the first two sections of the paper make use of 
the legislative framework as a way of contextualizing the main procedures and policies 
carried out in Lampedusa and Libya.  
Having examined, in the first two sections of the paper, the contentions surrounding 
Italy’s alleged violation of the right to asylum, the non-refoulment principle and the 
prohibition of collective expulsions, the following two sections bring into focus the data on 
migratory patterns into and from Libya that put into question a number of assumptions 
that inform Italian Government’s detention and deportation policies. The third section 
engages the images of emergency and mass-influx of undocumented migrants 
commonly summoned by the Governments and the media to portray migratory flows from 
Africa and show that these images produce an erroneous representation of 
contemporary Mediterranean migration and conceal Italy’s reluctance to assume its 
share of asylum responsibilities within the European Union (EU).  
Italy’s policies of detention and deportations and Libya’s enhancement of borders 
control in particular towards the Sub-Saharan neighbors are examined in the section four 
in relation to their function in deterring irregular migration and combating smuggling 
networks. The analysis undertaken in this section suggests that these policies might yield 
paradoxical effects such as ‘illegalizing’ the movement of certain groups of migrants and 
increasing rather than decreasing the involvement of smuggling networks. 
Italy’s implementation of policies and schemes that increase migrants and asylum 
seekers’ vulnerability and hamper the right of the latter group to access the asylum 
procedure raises the issue of European Commission’s (EC) responsibility and EU’s 
commitment to the protection of refugees. The return of undocumented migrants from the 
EU Member states and the collaboration with Libya on matters of irregular migration will 
soon be regulated by the EU return directive and the Libya-EU joint Action Plan. These 
instruments set out to provide a minimum set of procedural and legal safeguards for the 
return, removal and custody of third-county nationals residing illegally in EU Member 
States and limit the EU’s involvement in the detention facilities in Libya to the provision of 
heath care and services rather than support of return schemes. The analysis in section 
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five of the Return directive and the Action Plan as well as of the EC-funded IOM 
programs in Libya raise the issue whether the Commission is contracting out of its 
responsibilities over migration and asylum matters and whether the Return directive and 
the Action Plan leave too large space for the Member states to circumvent the EU 
framework and apply restrictive exceptions.  
Since the EU return directive and the joint Action Plan are new instruments and still to 
be finalized, the last section of this paper outlines a number of policy recommendations 
that would strengthen Commissions’ credibility as to its monitoring responsibility and 
EU’s commitment to refugee protection. Given the current lack of safeguards and control 
mechanisms on return and on EU’s cooperation with Libya, the recommendations point 
the role of the European Parliament in promoting a credible and effective framework for 
protection of asylum seekers. Transparency, accountability and legitimacy are key 
principles, this paper recommends, that need to guide European Union’s partnership with 
its neighbor states in the field of asylum, borders and immigration.  
2 Lampedusa Holding Center: Detention and the 
Right to Asylum 
Lampedusa holding center is located right on the airport of Lampedusa next to the 
runaway to which it has direct access.5 Surrounded by barbed wire and metal grilles, the 
center is composed of four prefabricated containers designated to host 186 people.6 In 
the words of Italian officials the center is a ‘temporary stay and assistance center’ 
functioning as a ‘clearing station’ and an ‘initial assistance’ center for undocumented 
migrants after they have disembarked on the island.7 Its function as a ‘clearing station’ 
consists in redirecting migrants and asylum seekers within shortest necessary time to 
other CPTAs in Italy or returning them to the country of last transit, usually Libya. The 
‘initial assistance’ stands for the emergency health assistance, clothing and food during 
undocumented migrants and asylum seekers are provided with during the period they are 
held in the CPTA awaiting the transfer/removal. The CPTA is mainly active between April 
                                            
5 CPTA has a direct access to the runaway. For a more detailed description see Andrijasevic, R, 
‘Lampedusa in Focus: Migrants caught between the Libyan desert and the deep sea’, Feminist Review no. 
82, 2006, pp. 119-124.  
6 186 places are centre’s legal capacity. See Corte dei Conti, Programma controllo 2004. Gestione delle 
risorse previste in connessione con il fenomeno dell’immigrazione, 2005, p. 103. 
7 Amnesty International, Italy: Temporary stay – Permanent rights: the treatment of foreign nationals 
detained in ‘temporary stay and assistance centres’ (CPTAs), 2005, p. 34.  
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and October, when the weather conditions permit the sea travel from Libya to the south of 
Italy.  
As instruments for detention of irregular migrants and asylum seekers, CPTAs were 
established under the ‘Turco-Napoletano’ law with the purpose of administrative 
detention of third country nationals pending expulsion from Italy.8 Asylum seekers, as 
well as migrants who have been served an expulsion order, are detained in CPTAs if they 
present an asylum application after having received an expulsion or refusal of entry order 
and/or if their appeal is at the final stage and they are awaiting the court’s decision on the 
appeal. The maximum period of detention for both groups is sixty days.9 The CPTAs 
however do not cater primarily to asylum seekers. The so-called ‘Bossi-Fini’ law 
amended the detention regulations set by ‘Turco-Napoletano’ law and established 
‘identification centers’ as specific centers for detention of asylum seekers. 10  While 
detention of asylum seekers cannot be carried out with the sole purpose of examining 
their application, it is nevertheless mandatory in cases when asylum seekers present 
their application after been arrested for entering or attempting to enter the country 
illegally, and/or residing in Italy in an irregular situation.11 An asylum seeker can be held 
in an identification center for a maximum of 30 days.12  The Italian Government is 
currently in the process of establishing the ‘polifunctional’ immigration centers to carry 
out administrative and juridical functions of both CPTAs and identification centers. 
                                            
8 Law 40/1998, later merged into Legislative Decree No 286 of July 1998. Decreto Legislativo 25 luglio 
1998, n. 286 – Testo unico delle disposizioni concernenti la disciplina dell’immigrazione e norme sulla 
condizione dello straniero.  
9 The legal procedure for the asylum seekers detained in identification centres and CPTAs is the same. In 
both cases asylum seekers fall under the fast-track procedure. The fast-track or simplified procedure was 
set up by ‘Bossi’Fini’ law and it supplements the ordinary procedure, now reserved only for those asylum 
seekers who have entered Italy legally. 
10 The Bossi-Fini law (Law 189/2002 of July 2002) tightened significantly the Italian immigration policy. It 
reduced from 15 to 5 the number of days irregular migrants have at their disposal to leave Italy once they 
have been issued with an expulsion order; increased from 30 to 60 the days irregular migrants can be held 
in a detention centres; and doubled the number of years (from 5 to 10) during which those issued with an 
expulsion order are banned from entering Italy. The Law set out that those served with an expulsion order 
are to be detained in the CPTAs prior to the forcible escort to the border instead of receive the injunction to 
leave the county and being expected to leave the country on their own without being detained in the CPTAs. 
It reinforced the expulsion methods and introduced the mandatory removal via forcible escort that prior to 
this law reform was optional and applied only when there was a concrete risk of a third country national 
disobeying the expulsion order.   
11 The Provincial Police Authority may however request detention in order to: verify or determine asylum 
seeker’s nationality or identity if they have no identification papers or travel documents or if they have 
produced false papers on arrival; check the claims on which the asylum seeker’s application is grounded; 
and bridge the gap for those asylum seekers awaiting the outcome of the procedure for entry to the country. 
12 The 30 days comprise 20 initial days with possible 10-day extension by the judge. For the CPTAs the 
maximum period of detention of 60 days involves the initial 30 days with a possible extension for other 30 
with judicial approval. 
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Throughout the 2004 and 20005, the holding center of Lampedusa has been 
denounced for the difficulty of accessing the asylum procedure. European NGOs have 
drawn attention to the failure of the center’s authorities to provide information about the 
possibility of claiming asylum and to guarantee individual examination of asylum through 
in-depth interviews that assess asylum seeker’s individual circumstance. Migrants and 
asylum seekers, the NGOs remark, have no effective access to an interpreter, are often 
identified by staff not qualified as interpreters13 and by use of improvised identification 
procedures where migrants’ nationality is determined on the basis of their skin color and 
facial characteristics.14 Since migrants and asylum seekers are deprived of the freedom 
of movement, are allocated phone-cards on sporadic basis, and lawyers who could assist 
them reside in Sicily, some 200km north of Lampedusa, the NGOs have argued that 
migrants have no effective access to legal aid.15  
The lack of proper interpretation and legal services, the difficulty for MPs, UNHCR16 
and NGOs of obtaining the permission to access the CPTA,17 and the withdrawal of 
information explaining the reasons for detention leave migrants and asylum seekers with 
little possibility to defend themselves and/or appeal. The difficulty of accessing asylum 
procedure puts asylum seekers in a legally extremely vulnerable position since they can 
                                            
13 During their visit to the Lampedusa CPTA, the delegates of the European Parliament’s Committee on 
Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) observed that the interpreters work from Arabic and English 
and not from French. Since many migrants and asylum seekers in Lampedusa CPTA seem to originate 
from Maghreb and sub-Saharan African countries and are French speaking, the lack of adequate 
interpretation makes it difficult to access the right information and/or state their circumstances.  See 
European Parliament, EP/LIBE PV/581203EN.    
14 See ‘Complaint against the Italian government for violation of European Community Law’, 20 January 
2005. The complaint and the accompanying dossier are available at  
http://www.gisti.org/doc/actions/2005/italie/complaint20-01-2005.pdf  
15 An undercover journalistic inquiry found out that the difficulty of making phone-calls is due to the fact that 
the phone-boot is regularly out of order and that contrary to the Charter of the rights and obligations of 
detained immigrants from 30 August 2000 stipulating that migrants should be given a telephone card worth 
5 euros every 10 days, the phone-cards are not distributed but rather sold by the ‘dealers’ inside of the 
camp for the amount thee times higher than cards original value. See Gatti, F. ‘Io, clandestino a 
Lampedusa’, L’espresso 6 October 2005a.  
16 Following the signing of the Asylum agreement between Italian Ministry and the UNHCR, which comes 
into effect on the 1st March 2006, UNHCR will be able to set its office on Lampedusa together with IOM and 
Italian Red Cross.  
17 The listing of who can access the CPTAs is provided under the provisions of the article 21 of DPR 394 of 
31 august 1999. According to Italian legislation the MPs have the right of entry to CPTAs and to all place of 
detention in Italy. To UNHCR staff can, with the authorization of the Ministry of Interior, access the CPTAs 
anytime and speak in private with the third country nationals who request such encounter. However, in 
March 2005 while 180 undocumented migrants and asylum seekers were being expelled to Libya on 
airplanes, the UNHCR requested immediate access to the Lampedusa CPTA but  its request got denied. 
During the same period two Italian senators, Mrs. Chiara Acciarini and Mrs. Tana de Zulueta were 
permitted to access the CTPA only the second day of their arrival to the island and then only to the part of 
the CPTA with the offices and could therefore not assess the conditions of detention not talk to the 
migrants. 
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be served the refusal of entry order. This in turn constitutes the legal basis for their 
expulsion from Italy or for subsequent detention in a CPTA as they presented the 
application after having received a refusal of entry order. Lack of in-depth individual 
assessment, serving of refusal orders to potential asylum seekers and their subsequent 
collective expulsion to Libya are reasons for which NGOs argue for Italy to be in breach of 
Geneva Convention’s non-refoulement principle.   
The NGOs also gathered evidence of arbitrary detention and degrading treatment of 
third country nationals in the Lampedusa center. ARCI, an Italian NGO that between 
June and October 2005 undertook an independent monitoring on Lampedusa maintains 
that a very small number of migrants and asylum seekers are served an expulsion or 
refusal of entry order. This puts into question the legal basis of detention since migrants 
and asylum seekers are nevertheless detained in the CPTA for a period between 25 and 
45/50 days awaiting their transfer to another CPTA or removal to Libya (ARCI 2005).18  
The amount of time that migrants and asylum seekers spent in the CPTA of Lampedusa 
is not officially recorded as detention meaning that once moved to another CPTA 
migrants and asylum seekers can still be detained for the maximum period allowed. 
Minors and pregnant women are held, as ARCI reports, with male adults and no special 
assistance is provided to pregnant women and minors.19 The center is permanently 
overcrowded20 and the detention conditions degrading: there is for example, no access 
to the proper health assistance21 and the hygienic conditions are prohibitive.22 Moreover, 
                                            
18 ARCI compiled a dossier containing information as to numbers of migrants arrived via sea, those 
removed to other CPTAs or to Libya, and the descriptions of police practices towards migrants. Since little 
official data is available so far, the dossier presented to the MEP delegation during their September visit, is 
a unique source of these kind. See Arci, ibid., 2005b. 
19 ARCI reports that many minors have been wrongly identified as adults. ARCI also expressed concern 
that, after been held in detention for 5 days, between 9th and 18th August 2005 only a part of 
unaccompanied minors were transferred to another CPTA while the rest was presumably expelled to Libya. 
ARCI’s data called attention to an alarming irregularity: after having been released from CPTA of 
Lampedusa, minors were reassigned to the reception centres of ‘Casa Amica’ in Agrigento (Sicily) and/or 
‘Association Three P’ in Licata. In Licata, they stay for an extremely short period of time –at times only 24 
hours—and from there they are all transferred to Milan following Association’s declarations that they have 
contacted minors’ parents or friend, all oddly residing in Milan. This operations occured, ARCI refers, 
without authorization or knowledge of the competent juridical authorities. Arci, ibid., 2005a. 
20 The four prefabricated containers, each with 40 beds, are insufficient for all the migrants. Made for 180, 
but accommodating commonly for 300 to 400 migrants between spring and autumn months, with 
occasional ‘peaks’ of over 1000 migrants in the summer, results in the majority sleeping on the sleeping 
mats on the floor in the corridors or on the ground outside. 
21 Only in case of urgent and life-threatening cases, migrants are brought to the local health-centre; all 
others are treated by Médecins sans Frontières (MSF – Doctors without borders) directly at the pier or in 
the camp by a doctor and a nurse. The MSF, the Italian office of the well-known humanitarian medical aid 
agency which assisted more than 10,000 people at the center of Lampedusa between September 2002 
and December 2003, was refused access to any CPTAs from 19 April 2004 onwards following the 
publication of their highly critical report on the detention and health conditions in Italian CPTAs entitled 
Centri di permanenza temporanea e assistenza: autonomia di un fallimento; Sinnos editrice, 2005. 
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recent journalistic sources have disclosed next to the already denounced use of force 
during the removal operations, also law enforcement officer’s abuse of migrants while in 
detention.23 These removals are often carried out by use of force, especially when 
migrants are reluctant to board the plane and attempt to run away, and by coercive 
methods such as the use of plastic handcuffs.24 
On the basis of gathered data ten European NGOs have taken legal actions against 
the Italian Government, filed a complaint with the European Commission25 and called the 
Commission to sanction Italy for:  
• Violation of the right of defense and of all parties to be heard26 and hence the right 
to asylum as recognized by the Amsterdam Treaty 
• Violation of the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment, provided 
for in article 4 of the European Charter of fundamental rights and article 3 of the 
European Convention for the protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms27  
In the complaint of the 20 January 2005 as well in successive open letters to the 
Council and the Commission,28 Amnesty International urged the Commission to publicly 
distance itself from the actions of the Italian authorities and to carry out an independent 
investigation regarding Italy’s compliance with international law obligations part of the EU 
acquis.29 
                                                                                                                                            
22 The CPTA that accommodates in average 400 migrants has about 10 toilets and as much showers and 
sinks, alimented exclusively by the sea water. Since the centre is not connected to the canalisation, the 
toilets are frequently clogged and they overspill to the floor and the outside.  
23 This includes physical abuse, humiliation and racist remarks. See Gatti, ibid., 2005a and the video from 
inside the camp by Italian undercover journalist Mauro Parissone.  
Http://euobserver.com/22/20167 (consulted on 16/11/2005).  
24 ARCI dossier demonstrates that police use physical force to carry out deportations, especially when 
migrants resist deportation or attempt to run away, and that the sign of physical injuries does not prevent 
the police from carrying on the removal. The Sicilian Antiracist Network video-recorded and circulated 
images of deportations at the Lampedusa camp. Since police prohibits filming or photographing, this 
material represents one of the few visual evidences of the deportations in Lampedusa. See Lampedusa 
Scoppia at http://www.ngvision.org/mediabase/487 
25 ANAFE - Association nationale d'assistance aux frontières pour les étrangers (France), Asociacion 
‘Andalucía Acoge’ (Spain), APDHA - Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos de Andalucía (Spain), ARCI - 
Associazione Ricreativa e Cultura Italiana (Italy), Asociaciòn ‘Sevilla Acoge’ (Spain), ASGI - Associazione 
per gli Studi Giuridici sull'Immigrazione (Italy), Cimade (France), Federación des Asociaciones SOS 
Racismo del Estado Español (Spain), Gisti - Groupe d'information et de soutien des immigrés (France), 
and ICS - Consorzio italiano solidarietà. See footnote 14. 
26 Given the short time elapsed between the arrival of the migrants and their deportation (at times as little as 
24 hours), NGOs claim that it is unlikely that the CPTA authorities examined individually the cases of 1000 
people. Further, they have been deprived of the right to file an appeal due to the decision by the Italian 
government to remove them. 
27 Conditions of detention fall under the definition of ‘inhumane and degrading treatment’. 
28 AI letter to JFS Commissioner Franco Frattini, dated 21 March 2005 (B456); and AI appeal to the EU 
regarding expulsions from Italy to Libya, dated 28 June 2005 (B472) 
29 In particular with Italy’s obligation under articles 5 (information), 6 (documentation), 7 (residence and 
freedom of movement), 13 and 15 (material reception and health care) of the directive 2003/9/EC laying 
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Italian authorities confirm the NGOs’ data on 350-400 average daily presences in the 
Lampedusa CPTA, the case of overcrowding up to 1000 people during the summer 
months and the presence in the CPTA of women and minors. Their position diverges 
though on other points raised by NGOs. Even though there are cases when the 
third-country nationals are detained up to 60 days, the Italian authorities maintain that in 
most cases migrants’ stay at the CPTA does not exceed four to five days. They state that 
majority of detained migrants are Egyptian nationals and that nationality is determined on 
the basis of their physical characteristics and accent, as well as a short individual 
interview to which everyone is entitled. As explained by the Italian authorities, if migrants 
do not come forward to request asylum they are immediately repatriated to Libya or to 
their country of origin.30 Those who however do request asylum are moved to the 
Crotone CPTA, on Italian mainland. The authorities state also that the majority of 
third-country nationals arriving from Libya are not asylum seekers but rather economic 
migrants.  
Despite the denial by the Italian government that human rights violations take place in 
Lampedusa holding center,31 the United Nations’ Human Rights Committee expressed 
concern about the conditions of detention and procedures in Lampedusa CPTA and 
called on Italy to keep the Committee closely informed about the ongoing administrative 
and judicial inquiries on matters of detention conditions, procedural irregularities and 
collective deportations to Libya.32 Given the seriousness of numerous allegations raised 
by NGOs, a delegation of twelve MEPs part of the Committee on Citizens’ Freedoms and 
Rights, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) of the European Parliament arrived to the island 
of Lampedusa on 15th and 16th September 2005 in order to assess the identification and 
removal procedures, the treatment of the detainees and the running of the CPTA. This 
visit was preceded by EP’s Resolution on Lampedusa in April same year in which the EP 
called on Italy to guarantee the individual examination of the requests for asylum and 
grant UNHCR free access to the Lampedusa CPTA. As for the European NGOs, the EP 
                                                                                                                                            
down minimum standards for the reception conditions of asylum seekers.  
30 EP/LIBE PV/581203EN, p.3. 
31 See Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs’ written reply prepared for the 85th session of the UN Human 
Rights Committee. Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Interministerial Committee of Human Rights, Reply to List of 
Issues (CCPR/C/84/L/ITA) (Relating to CCPR/C/ITA/2004-5), U.N. Human Rights Committee 85th Session, 
Geneva 17 October – 3 November 2005. 
32 CCPR/C/ITA/CO/5 dated 28th October 2005. 
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called on the European Commission to ensure that the Member States comply with their 
obligations under the EU law and that the right of asylum is respected in the EU.33  
3 Libya and the Case of Collective Expulsions 
Between October 2004 and March 2005, Italian authorities returned more than 1500 
irregular migrants and asylum seekers to Libya from Lampedusa holding center. The 
biggest operation took place between the 1st and 7th of October 2004, four days before to 
the EU’s lifting of the eight-years-long arms embargo on Libya on 11th October 2004. 
During those six days, a total of 1153 irregular migrants and asylum seekers were 
expelled to Libya. The operations continued throughout Spring and Summer with 
expulsions of another 494 people in March, 150 in May, 45 in June and 65 in August 2005. 
No information is available concerning the whereabouts of migrants and asylum seekers 
expelled to Libya.34 Human Rights Watch believes that majority has been detained in 
Libyan detention camps.35 
The expulsions from the Lampedusa CPTA to Libya are part of Italian-Libyan 
collaboration on matters of irregular migration regulated though a bilateral agreement 
signed in Tripoli in August 2004. While the content of the agreement is still undisclosed 
despite solicitations from the European Parliament,  UN Human Rights Committee and 
various European NGOs, the EP believes that the agreement requires Libyan authorities 
to supervise irregular migration within and into its territory and commits them to readmit 
migrants returned by Italy.36 Next to the bilateral agreement signed in 2004, Italy and 
Libya also signed in 2000 in Rome an agreement to fight terrorism, organized crime, 
drugs traffic and illegal migration; in September 2002 in Tripoli an operational agreement 
which led in July 2003 to the establishment of a permanent liaison on organized crime 
and illegal migration between Italian police officers and Libyan Security General 
Directorate.37 The collaboration between Italy and Libya extends beyond expulsions from 
Lampedusa holding center and includes the construction of detention centers and the 
                                            
33 European Parliament, European Parliament Resolution on Lampedusa, 14th April 2005, 
P6_TA(2005)0138. 
34 The data provided by the Italian authorities specify that 1153 migrants were returned to Libya between 
29th September and 8th October 2004 and another 494 between 13th and 21st of March 2005 (EP/LIBE 
PV/581203EN, p.2). Italian authorities provide no data for later expulsions. The numbers reported here 
come from NGO sources.  
35 Human Rights Watch, World Report. Events of 2005, p. 373. 
36 EP, P6_TA(2005)0138. Moreover, journalistic sources specify that the agreement requires Libya to 
increase control over its borders in the Saharan region. See Gatti, F., ibid., 2005b.  
37 European Commission, Report on the Technical Mission to Libya on Illegal Immigration, 2005, pp. 58-59. 
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development of return schemes in Libya. In 2003 Italy financed the construction of a 
camp for illegal migrants in the north of the country (Gharyan) close to Tripoli. For the 
2004-2005 period Italy allocated funds for the realization of two more camps: one in the 
city of Kufra located in the south-east close to the border with Egypt and Sudan, and the 
other in city of Sebha in the south-west of Libya.38 In 2003 and 2004 Italy financed also a 
program of charter flights for the repatriation of irregular migrants from Libya. A total of 
5688 migrants were repatriated on 47 charter flights to Egypt, Ghana and Nigeria as main 
destinations.39  
Future implementations of detention and expulsions schemes are developed in 
collaboration with IOM, a key partner for both Italian and Libyan governments.40 Italy was 
scheduled to fund an IOM pilot project in Libya starting in August 2005.41 As far as Libya 
is concerned, following the agreement signed on the 9th August 2005 for opening of an 
IOM office in Tripoli,42 IOM and Libya defined a program of activities with the aim of 
supporting the Libyan Government to counter illegal migration and develop a long-term 
migration management approach. Under the Program for the Enhancement of Transit 
and Irregular Migration Management (TRIM), IOM will be responsible for:  
                                            
38 In spite the fact that the Italian MPs requested detailed information about the location of the camps in 
Libya and the amount of funding, the Italian Government confirmed and disclosed the position of the camps 
only recently in the report by the Italian Audit Court. The amount allocated for the construction of the camps 
remains however still unknown but according to the EC report the funding is classified as humanitarian 
support. EC, ibid., p. 59.   
39 Other destinations were Mali, Pakistan, Niger, Eritrea, Bangladesh, Sudan and Syria. EC, ibid., pp. 
61-62. 
40 Since July 2000, Italy and Tunisia have been running joint control activities of Tunisian coastline. Italian 
police provides training courses for Tunisian border guards. Tunis rejected the Italian funding for the 
establishment of detention centres in Tunisia since the government feared Italy’s interference into matters 
of domestic affairs. Cuttitta, P. ‘Delocalization of migration controls to North Africa’, paper presented at the 
workshop The Europeanisation of National Immigration Policies – Varying Developments across Nations 
and Policy Areas, European Academy, 1-3 September 2005, Berlin. 
41 While neither Italy nor IOM have disclosed the content of the project, the reports from NGOs and 
individual experts that the deportation from Lampedusa to Libya acquired nearly a weekly regularity after 
the signing of IOM-Libyan agreement suggest the pilot project to be a repatriation project or a so-called 
Assisted Voluntary Return (AVR) Programme. These information where gathered by the author in 
Lampedusa during the Asia-Europe Foundation workshop The Management of Humanitarian Aids and of 
Transnational Movements of Persons in the Euro-Mediterranean Area and in South-East Asia, 28-30 
August 2005, Lampedusa. 
42 The cooperation between IOM and Libyan Government was developed in the framework of the 5+5 
Regional Dialogue on Migration. As an informal dialogue on migration,  5+5 Dialogue is a forum that bring 
together the Maghreb countries (Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia) and the countries of the 
‘arc Latin’ (France, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Spain) to promote the prevention and fight against irregular 
migration and trafficking in countries of origin, transit and destination. As a partner in the 5+5 Dialogue, as 
preceding the regional seminar on irregular migration in the western Mediterranean in Tripoli on 8 and 9 
June 2004, IOM organized in cooperation with Libya’s People’s Committee for Public Security a training 
session for 100 Libyan officials and police representatives. The focus of the session was on border and 
migration management and on assisted voluntary return for irregular migrants in Libya. IOM, Dialogue 5+5. 
Newsletter, n. 1 issue, 2004. 
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• Labor selection programs for migrant workers in order to supply Libya’s labor 
demand; 
• Information campaigns to warn potential migrants about the dangers of irregular 
migration; 
• Improvement of services (such as heath care) and conditions of detention for 
irregular migrants in detention centers in Libya; 
• Development of an Assisted Voluntary Return Program (AVR) and Reinsertion 
program aiming to return irregular migrants in Libya to their countries of origin; 
• Strengthening of cooperation on irregular migration between origin and destination 
countries.43     
NGOs claim that the signing of the bilateral agreement between Libya and Italy in 
August 2004 led to widespread arrests in Libya of individuals from sub-Saharan Africa,44 
and that 106 migrants lost their lived during subsequent repatriations from Libya to 
Niger.45 NGOs point out that due to the improvised identification practices in Lampedusa 
CPTA migrants and asylum seekers are at risk of being expelled to a country with which 
they have no relationship. The improvised identification of large numbers of migrants as 
Egyptians, NGOs claim, are at the base of forced collective removals of migrants first to 
Libya and later to Egypt with whom Libya collaborates in matters of illegal migration.46 
The NGOs and activists have hence pressured air carriers to refuse to expel migrants 
from the Lampedusa holding center to Libya.47  
Evidence gathered by Amnesty International (AI) points further to the risk that 
removed asylum seekers and irregular migrants face in Libya. As AI documented, the 
Libyan State practices incommunicado detention of suspected political opponents, 
migrants and possible asylum seekers, torture while in detention, unfair trails leading to 
long-term prison sentences or death penalty, and ‘disappearance’ and death of political 
prisoners in custody. Migrants and asylum seekers in particular are often victims of 
                                            
43 EC, ibid., p. 15. 
44 AI, ‘Immigration Cooperation with Libya: the Human rights perspective. AI briefing ahead of the JHA 
Council 14 April 2005’.  
Http://www.amnesty-eu.org/static/documents/2005/JHA_Libya_april12.pdf   
45 For a description of these expulsions and the itineraries across the desert see F. Gatti, ibid., 2005b. 
46 Requested on several occasions, the Italian authorities have so far not presented the list of expulsions 
orders from the Lampedusa CPTA. During their visit to the CPTA, the LIBE committee could not view the 
records of arrivals and departures since, the Italian Authorities claim, they are not held at the centre but at 
the offices of the Agrigento (Sicily) police.  
47 Alitalia, the Italian national air carrier, and AirAdriatic (AA), a private Croatian air carrier, are currently the 
two main companies that are removing migrants from Lampedusa CPTA to Libya or to other CPTAs in 
mainland Italy such as the one in Crotone. Previously, also the Italian charter carrier Blue Panorama was 
taking part in the removals and expulsions, but has retracted from it following the pressure from the NGOs 
and the protest a number of activist organized on 2nd of April 2005 --the European Day for Freedom of 
Movement-- in front of company’s offices in Rome. In Croatia, Amnesty International Croatia has urged 
AirAdriatic to cease the deportation flights to Libya and appealed to AA to respect international human 
rights conventions.   
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arbitrary detentions, inexistent or unfair trials, killings, and disappearances and torture in 
the detention camps.48 Once migrants and asylum seekers are detained in Libya there is 
virtually no way for NGOs to assist them or verify the conditions of detention and the 
relative expulsion procedure. The Libyan detention centers are in fact almost 
inaccessible to international organizations or human rights groups and UNHCR is unable 
to access people returned from Lampedusa to Libya since it cannot operate its protection 
mandate in Libya. 
In light of gathered data on current removal practices, a coalition of 13 European 
NGOs49 proposed to the Member States and the EU a number of core principles to be 
applied during the repatriations in order to ensure that the policies fully respect the needs 
and dignity of individuals. 50  In the complaint filed with the European Commission 
concerning the expulsions from Lampedusa holding center to Libya, the NGOs called to 
the Commission to sanction Italy for: 
• Violation of the prohibition of collective expulsions provided for in article 4 of the 4th 
Protocol of the European Charter of Human Rights (ECHR) and fundamental 
freedoms, and article II-19-1of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and article 13 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
• Violation of the non-refoulement principle51 prescribed in article 33 of the 1951 
Geneva Convention on Refugees and Article 3 of the Convention against Torture52 
                                            
48 Amnesty International’s report quotes testimonies of hundreds of Burkinabé nationals as well as several 
Eritrean and Nigerian migrants who were expelled from Libya to their country of origin after their documents 
and possessions were confiscated. They testified to having been detained in inhumane conditions, 
including lack of water, food and medical care. Amnesty International, Libya: time to make human rights a 
reality, 2004, AI INDEX MDE 19/002/2004.   
49 ‘Common Principles on removal of irregular migrants and rejected asylum seekers’, August 2005 by 
Amnesty International, EU Office; Caritas Europa; Churches’ Commission for Migrants on Europe (CCME); 
European Council for Refugees and Exiles (ECRE); Human Rights Watch Jesuit Refugee Service –Europe 
(JRS); Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants (PICUM); Quaker Council for 
European Affairs; Save the Children; Cimade (France); Iglesia Evangelica Espanola; Federazione delle 
Chiese Evangeliche in Italia (FCEI); and SENSOA (Belgium). The NGOs put these principles forward as 
the Commission Director General for JHA visited Libya on 22 June 2005 in order to start the cooperation on 
countering of illegal  immigration and the Commission went ahead to draft the EU return directive. 
50 These core principles are to be applied also in so-called transit, border and airport zones in the EU. They 
are: voluntary return should always be the priority; vulnerable persons should be protected against removal 
(non-refoulement, children, seriously ill people, victims of trafficking and pregnant women); persons subject 
to a removal order should always have access to effective remedies, detention for the purpose of removal 
should be the last resort, family unit should be strictly respected; independent monitoring and control 
bodies should be created; use of force should comply with Council of Europe recommendations; re-entry 
ban should be prohibited; and a legal status should be granted to persons who cannot be removed.  
51 The non-refoulement principle has been reaffirmed by the EU as the cornerstone of refugee protection. It 
prohibits the forcible return of anyone to a territory where they would be at risk of serious human rights 
violations: "No contracting state shall expel or return (refouler), a refugee in any manner to the frontiers of 
territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group, or political opinion”. This principle makes reference to the lack of 
individual assessments and to the removal of persons to countries where there exists a serious risk to the 
physical integrity of those concerned (mentioned in article 19§2 of the European Charter).  
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Italian authorities have responded to the allegations of collective expulsions by 
invoking the article 10 of Law 189/2002 and in particular the procedures regarding the 
refusal of entry (respingimento alla frontiera). The authorities claim that removals from 
the Lampedusa CPTA are not expulsions but rather refusals of entry on individual basis. 
An expulsion needs to be decided by the judge and prohibits entry into Italy for ten years 
while a refusal of entry is an administrative measure that does not ban the migrant from 
entering the Italian territory in the future.53 Irregular migrants reaching Lampedusa are 
hence served refusals of entry and returned to Libya as they have transited Libya prior to 
reaching Italy. Italian authorities insist that the refusals of entry take place on a case by 
case basis and that since the majority of migrants reaching Lampedusa are economic 
migrants rather than refugees, Italy is in no violation of the refoulement principle or in 
breach of Geneva Convention.54 The Italian Government has explained its refusal to 
disclose the content of the bilateral agreement with Libya by saying that making the 
agreement public would diminish the success of countering smuggling and trafficking 
networks responsible for organizing and profiting from irregular migration from Libya into 
Italy.   
In its observations on Italy during its 85th Session in Geneva in November 200555, the 
UN Human Rights Committee, raised the issue of the right to international protection and 
recalled the right of each person not to be expelled to a country where he/she might face 
torture or ill treatment. Along similar lines, in its Resolution on Lampedusa the European 
Parliament called on Italy to refrain from collective expulsions to Libya and took the view 
that these expulsions constitute a violation of the principle of non-refoulement. EP also 
called on Libya to allow access to international observers, halt the expulsions and 
arbitrary arrests of migrants, ratify the Geneva Convention and recognize the mandate of 
the UNHCR.  
                                                                                                                                            
52 Migrants and asylum seekers are deported to Libya, the country lacking minimum guarantees of 
protection. This is in contravention with the article II-19-2 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
according to which "No one may be removed, expelled or extradited to a State where there is a serious risk 
that they may be subjected to the death penalty, torture or inhuman or degrading treatment". Italy obligation 
to non-refouleur to a country lacking minimum guarantees of protection is reinforced by the fact that Italy is 
a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms. 
53 EP/LIBE PV/581203EN.  
54 The response by Alessandro Pansa, the Director general of the immigration and border police of the 
Italian Ministry of Interior delivered to the UN Human Rights Committee during its 85th Session on the 20th 
October 2005. Notes taken by Claire Rodier, GISTI. Http://www.migreurop.org/article909.html  
55 See footnote 31. 
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4 Misrepresentation of Migratory Flows to Italy  
Italian Government considers detentions in the Lampedusa CPTA and successive 
expulsions to Libya measures indispensable to counter the emergency caused by 
mass-influx of people from Libya and to deter ‘a million illegal migrants’ waiting on Libyan 
shores from crossing over to Italy.56 At a first glance, the image of ‘a million illegal 
migrants’ might express Italian State’s difficulty in managing large-scale migration from 
the South. The expression, however, merits a more serious consideration because it 
brings together a number of misconceptions that inform Italy’s migratory policies: it 
inflates the numbers as to produce the imagery of invasion, assumes that the entries via 
the Italian southern border constitute the majority of Italy’s undocumented migrants and 
conveys the image that the bulk of migratory flows in and through Libya is of clandestine 
nature and geared towards Europe.  
As for the migration from Eastern Europe during the 1990s –to which by now the 
scholars refer as ‘the invasion that never took place’57— so for the current migration to 
Italy via Libya, the reference to the magnitude of migratory flows invokes the fantasy of 
invasion from the South. The existing data offer however a different image of migratory 
flows towards Italy. The recent report from the Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs indicates 
that the majority of third county nationals residing illegally in the country have not reached 
Italy via sea nor crossed its borders undocumented. They have on the contrary entered 
the county at its land borders with the valid entry clearance and become undocumented 
once their visa expired or after they overstayed their permit of residence. According to the 
same source, only 10% of undocumented migrants currently residing in Italy entered the 
country ‘illegally’ via its sea borders.58  
The arrival of circa 10500 migrants and asylum seekers to the island of Lampedusa in 
2004 represents certainly a heavy load for a small island of 20km² with a population of 
5500. Yet, if we exaggerate the numbers and assume for analytical purposes only that all 
of 10500 migrants are asylum seekers, this would certainly provoke a sharp increase in 
numbers of asylum seekers and refugees in Italy from 901959 to more than its double. 
                                            
56 This number was given by Italian Ministry of Interior G. Pisanu. See il manifesto 22nd April 2005, p. 9. 
Http://www.ilmanifesto.it/Quotidiano-archivio/22-Aprile-2005/art74.html (consulted on 25/04/2005) 
57 Simoncini, A., ‘Migranti, frontiere, spazi di confine. I lavoratori migranti nell’ordine salariale’, altreragioni, 
pp. 29-45, 2000. 
58 See Caritas/Migrantes, Immigrazione. Dossier Statistico 2005. Edizioni IDOS, Roma, 2005. 
59 Data from Italian Ministry of Interior, Http://www.cir-onlus.org/Statisticheitalia.htm (consulted 10 
December 2005). 
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What might appear at a first glance as a worrisome perspective needs to be viewed in 
proportion to the national population size. The 9019 applications filed in 2004 translate 
roughly in Italy receiving 16 asylum seekers per 100,000 inhabitants.60 Even if doubled, 
the total number of requests for asylum in Italy would be of 34 requests for asylum and 
hence still remain below the EU average of 60 asylum seekers per 100,000 inhabitants.61 
While this increase is a hypothetical one, it is nevertheless useful as to illustrate the gap 
between asylum trends in Italy and other EU countries and to point to Italy’s reluctance in 
taking on its share of asylum responsibilities within the EU.   
An example of this reluctance is the earlier discussed fact that the Italian authorities 
maintain that migrants arriving from Libya to Lampedusa are economic migrants rather 
than asylum seekers and refer to all of them as illegal migrants. Since the Libyan 
government does not recognize the category of asylum seekers and the authorities of 
Lampedusa CPTA allegedly fail to investigate migrants’ nationality and classify the 
majority as Egyptians, there is no record which would permit a systematic identification of 
migrants’ countries of origin. A study of migratory patterns in Libya indicates however that 
refugees are part of migratory flows that transit Libya and by using the case of Malta 
where the majority of new arrivals in 2004 were from Eritrea, Ivory Coast, Sudan and 
Somalia, suggests to pay major attention to the nationality of migrants since it reflects the 
map of current African conflicts.62  
Libya’s migratory reality is far from being, as suggested by the image of ‘a million 
illegal migrants’ on Libyan shores, a country of emigration or a transit route for 
clandestine migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa to Italy. On the contrary, Libya is in first 
place a destination country and the major country of immigration in the Maghreb. Foreign 
nationals constitute approximately 25 to 30% of Libya’s total population. Large-scale 
economic and social development schemes in the 1970s, launched thanks to the 
revenues from the petroleum industry, relied in the first instance on the migrant laborers 
from Egypt. Egyptian nationals, employed mainly in the agriculture industry and 
                                            
60 Asylum levels in Italy are in fact among the lowest in Europe and in 2004 reported a fall of 26%, which is 
5% above the EU average. These numbers are extrapolated from the UNHCR’s 2005 report on Asylum 
levels and Trends in Industrialized Countries 2004. Overview of Asylum Applications longed in Europe and 
non-European industrialized countries in 2004. Population data unit/PGDS: UNHCR Geneva. 
http://www.unhcr.ch/statistics  
61 This calculation does not take into consideration that out of 9019 requests for asylum filed in 2004, only 
781 were approved. The readers are hence asked to bear in mind that a hypothetical increase calculated 
above concerns only requests for asylum rather than the allocation of the asylum status.  
62 Pliez, O. ‘La troisième migratoire, les conséquences de la politique européenne de lutte contre les 
migrations clandestines’, paper written for Asia-Europe Foundation workshop The Management of 
Humanitarian Aids and of Transnational Movements of Persons in the Euro-Mediterranean Area and in 
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education, constitute today the largest migrant group in Libya.63 Libya is home also to a 
large Maghrebi community (Morocco, Tunis and Alger) 64  and country’s economic 
development in particular in the Saharan region relies on the cheap and seasonal labor 
from the neighboring countries of Niger, Chad and Sudan.65 Since the 1990s, labor 
migrants from neighboring African countries have been a key factor in Libya’s economic 
growth. The influx of migrant workers from sub-Saharan states is prompted by Libya’s 
reorientation of from pan-Arab to pro-African policy66 and its active role in the foundation 
of the Community of Sahel-Saharan states (CEN-SAD) which, as an economic project 
grounded in the free circulation of people and goods between its member states, is 
oriented towards regional cooperation and integration.67 Migrant workers from Sudan, 
Chad and Niger are generally present in the Libyan Saharan border areas where they 
work in sectors such as agriculture, tourism and local trade. These labor migrations, 
facilitated by the open border policy towards sub-Saharan Africa are of temporary and 
pendular character rather than, as commonly assumed, the source of irregular migratory 
movement to Europe.68  
Inflating the numbers relative to the migratory flows to Italy from Libya, as some 
politicians and mass-media do, results in an erroneous and misleading representation of 
Libya’s migratory history and of the contemporary migration in the Mediterranean area. 
Images such as a ‘million illegal migrants’ produce and manipulate the fear of invasion 
through a distorted account of migratory patters in Libya and conceal Italy’s reluctance to 
                                                                                                                                            
South-East Asia, 2005. 
63 Hamood, S., African Transit Migration through Libya to Europe: the Human Costs. The American 
University on Cairo, Forced Migration and Refugee Studies. 2006.  
64 Boubakri estimates that 2 to 2.5 millions of foreigners live in Libya, namely 25 to 30% of the country’s 
total population. Out of this there are approximately 200 000 Moroccans, 60 000 Tunisians and 20 000 – 30 
000 Algerians. Boubakri, H. ‘Transit Migration between Tunisia, Libya and Sub-Saharan Africa: Study 
Based on Greater Tunis’, Regional Conference Migrants in Transit Countries: Sharing Responsibility for 
Management and Protection, Council of Europe: MG-RCONF (2004)6e; p. 2. 
65 Boubakri, H., ibid., and Pliez, O., ibid.   
66 Disappointed by the lack of support from the Arab countries, the isolation from the international 
community due to the bombings in 1998 of flights over Lockerbie in Scotland and in 1989 over Niger, and 
the 1992 UN Security Council arms embargo on Libya, Colonel Mu’ammar al-Qaddafi reoriented Libya’s 
foreign policy from Arab towards its sub-Saharan neighbours, and hence from pro-Arab to pro-African 
policy. 
67 Libya is a key member of the Group of Sahel-Saharan States and of the African Union. The Group also 
known as CEN-SAD (the Community of states bordering the Sahara and the Sahel) was established in 
1998 in Tripoli. It members are: Egypt, Djibouti, Libya, Morocco, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, Senegal, Eritrea, 
Chad, Central Africa, Gambia, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Togo and Benin. African Union was 
founded in 1999 by the Organisation of African Unity whose main objectives were to ‘rid the continent of the 
remaining vestiges of colonization and apartheid; to promote unity and solidarity among African States; to 
coordinate and intensify cooperation for development; to safeguard the sovereignty and territorial integrity 
of Member States and to promote international cooperation within the framework of the United Nations’. 
http://www.africa-union.org/ 
68 Pliez, O. ibid. 
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admit asylum seekers and refugees to its territory and, atypically for an EU state, its 
failure to pass an organic law on the right to asylum under discussion since the 2002. 
5 The Production of Illegal Migration 
Much attention has been given to collective expulsion of third country nationals from 
Lampedusa CPTA to Libya in terms of the ‘externalization’ of asylum. Externalization 
stands for the propensity of several EU Member States to establish centers for 
processing of asylum applications outside of the EU’s external borders. In fact, the 
expulsions to Libya occurred in a highly charged political atmosphere surrounding the 
proposal to set up refugee processing centers in North Africa.69 Initially put forward by the 
UK and rejected during the 19-20 June 2003 Thessaloniki European Council, the 
proposal envisioned the establishment of ‘Regional Processing Areas’ (RPAs) and 
‘Transit Processing Centers’ (TPCs) located outside the external borders of the EU.70 
Under this proposal, promoted some months earlier by Denmark,71 RPAs were to be 
located in the zones of origin of refugees as a means of strengthening reception 
capacities close to the areas of crisis. On the other hand, the location of TPCs was 
envisioned closer to EU borders as centers where asylum seekers and refugees were to 
submit their asylum claims and await the result of their applications for asylum in the EU. 
France, Spain and Sweden rejected the proposal for refugee processing centers. 
Nevertheless, in October 2004, the month of largest collective expulsions from 
Lampedusa CPTA to Libya, the informal EU Justice and Home Affairs Council 
considered the implementation of five pilot projects with the aim of upgrading the existing 
detention facilities and developing asylum laws in North-West Africa. Proposed by the EC 
                                            
69 The countries proposed by the UK were: Albania, Croatia, Iran, Morocco, northern Somalia, Romania, 
Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine. British proposal was influenced by the so-called ‘Pacific Solution’ 
implemented by Australia. Having come to public attention in Europe following the MS Tampa incident in 
2001, Australian model is based on systematic removal of boat arrivals to Nauru and Papua New Guinea 
islands, both outside Australian territory and jurisdiction. There migrants claims are processed under 
preclusion of ordinary juridical control and await the outcome of their application in the detention camp. For 
PM Tony Blair’s 10 March 2003 letter to the Greek Presidency, see 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2003/apr/blair-simitis-asile.pdf 
70 The proposal, advanced by German Minister of Interior Otto Schily and Italian Minister 
Giuseppe Pisanu, was supported by Germany, Italy and United Kingdom (UK) and rejected by France and 
Spain.  
71 During the Danish presidency during the second half of 2002, the ‘reception in the region’ was identified 
as a priority in the area of asylum and migration. In Noll, G. ‘Visions of the Exceptional: Legal and 
Theoretical Issues Raised by Transit Processing Centres and Protection Zones’, in European Journal of 
Migration and Law 5, 2003, 303-341. 
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and co-funded by the Netherlands, the pilot projects targeted Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, 
Morocco and Tunisia.72  
On the basis of the above-described chronology of events, it is tempting to identify the 
collective expulsions from Lampedusa to Libya in terms of externalization of asylum. The 
fact that third-country nationals are precluded from presenting asylum claims, removed 
from Lampedusa to Libya and then most likely placed in the detention facilities financed 
by the Italian Government, might indeed seem the case of externalization of asylum. The 
idea of externalization presupposes however that asylum seekers and refugees are 
relocated to facilities where they are granted protection and where they can access the 
asylum determination procedure. Since the external processing centers do not exist so 
far and Libya in practice has no refugee policy, Italy’s expulsion of third-country nationals 
to Libya constitutes the case of retraction of the right to asylum rather than its 
externalization.73 As such, the policy of expulsions carries the risk of turning out to be 
counterproductive. Whereas the expulsions are carried out as a deterrent for 
undocumented migration, the obstacles to file an asylum request are likely to increase 
irregular migration. In fact, those who would otherwise seek asylum might become 
irregular migrants due to the effective impossibility in accessing the asylum procedure.74  
The deterrence of unwanted migration from Africa, the core element of Italian-Libyan 
cooperation on irregular migration, extends further to border guards training and the 
supply of devices and equipment requested by the Libyan authorities to achieve a better 
control of country’s sea and land borders in particular towards the Sub-Saharan Africa.75 
These measures are inter alia geared towards combating smuggling of migrants and 
preventing further loss of lives at sea due to boats’ overcrowding and smugglers’ 
negligence. While well intended, the idea of strengthening border controls in order to 
                                            
72 The Commission denied that these pilot projects are directly linked to plans to create EU reception 
centres in North Africa.  Antonio Vitorino, Justice and Home Affairs Commissioner, declared however that 
“in the short term the Commission could envisage the possibility of setting up humanitarian reception 
centres in the countries bordering the Mediterranean.” EUOBSERVER, 4th October 2004 .  
73 The danger of this happening was foreseen by Gregor Noll in his brilliant piece on legal and practical 
issues raised by the idea of external processing where he argues that the proposal to establish processing 
and protection centres outside the EU represents a serious threat to the existing institution of asylum and 
that these are likely to result in ending of legal and factual protection for certain groups of people. See 
footnote 73. 
74 Current research on migration on Libya confirms these claims. See Hamood, S. ibid., pp. 33-46. 
75 Libya is often characterized as lacking a comprehensive strategy on migration and border management 
and the migration into and via Libya is outlined as a negative effect of Libya’s open-border policy towards 
sub-Saharan Africa. Within this framework, the recent deportations from Libya to Maghreb countries and 
sub-Saharan Africa funded by the Italian Government have been seen as a step forward in establishing a 
migration management system in Libya. What these practices disregard however is that in Libya 
deportations as state policy have been in place since 1966 and hence well before Lampedusa became the 
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prevent smuggling and trafficking in migrants can yield paradoxical consequences. 
Libya’s open border policy towards sub-Saharan Africa and in particular towards Chad, 
Niger and Sudan is a key point of the regional integration in Sahelian Africa. Following 
the EC’ technical mission to Libya, experts confirmed that many migrants from Chad, 
Niger and Sudan settled in the southern cities of the Libyan desert without intention to 
transit further to Europe.76 Strengthening the control at the border between Libya and its 
sub-Saharan African neighbors is likely to create obstacles to the free movement of 
people and illegalise the seasonal labor migration in the region.77  
The case of EU’s enlargement eastward showed that tightening of border and visa 
controls enhances migrants’ vulnerability and feeds into smuggling networks. As a 
research on the demand for trafficked migrants’ labor has shown, if arranging a visa is not 
cheap and easy migrants will not be able to access (even when available) the formal 
governmental migratory channels.78 Instead, they will resort to irregular channels that in 
turn taking advantage of migrants’ legal vulnerability whether by charging higher costs for 
travel and documents or profiting from their labor at various points of the journey.79 
Stricter immigration controls aimed at preventing trafficking do not necessarily protect 
migrants from abuse but might foster migrants’ vulnerability to violence during the travel, 
increase the costs of ‘doing business’ 80  and leave ample space for third parties’ 
profiteering and abuse.  
The little available data from Libya confirm these findings. Following the signing of the 
bilateral agreement between Italy and Libya in August 2004, journalistic sources report 
that Libyan authorities targeted sub-Saharan Africans with arrests, detentions and 
deportations.81 These allegations were confirmed by the EC’s technical mission to Libya 
during which the experts verified that recent arrests and detentions were often of arbitrary 
nature and affected migrants from Niger, Ghana and Mali who have been working in 
Libya for more than a decade.82 The operations of repatriation, currently the main focus 
                                                                                                                                            
main point of entry into Italy for migrants departing from Libya. See Pleiez, O., ibid.  
76 EC, ibid., p. 39. 
77 See Maccanico, Y. ‘The European Commission Technical Mission to Libya: Exporting Fortress-Europe’, 
Statewatch bulletin, vol. 15 no. 2, March-April 2005. 
78 Anderson, B. and J. O’Connell Davidson, Needs and Desires: Is there a Demand for "Trafficked" 
Persons?, Geneva, IOM, 2003  
79 See for example the research on trafficking in women in Europe Andrijasevic, R. ‘La traite des femmes 
d’Europe de l’Est en Italie’ Revue européenne des migrations internationals Vol 21(1), 2005, pp. 155-175.  
80 Salt, J. and J. Stein, ‘Migration as a Business: The Case of Trafficking’. International Migration, 35(4), 
1997, pp. 467-491. 
81 Gatti, F. ibid., 2005b.  
82 In their report, the EC experts state that the reasons for arrests and repatriations carried out by Libyan 
authorities are unclear and arbitrary. Although migrants were in an irregular legal situation they were 
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of Libyan authorities especially in the south of the country, are organized by the state or 
at times requested by migrants who prefer to pay for their own return rather than remain 
detained for indeterminate period of time. Italian journalist Fabrizio Gatti who traveled 
with returnees on a lorry from Libya to Niger via the desert, reported that these returns 
expose migrants to various type of abuse. These vary from financial profiteering 
(following the increase in arrests and expulsions third parties who organize the travel 
have allegedly tripled the price of the journey out of Libya), theft (third parties steal 
migrants’ belongings and leave them in the desert), labor exploitation (migrants who run 
out of money during the journey get stuck in various settlements in the desert where their 
work under harsh conditions in exchange for food and shelter), and death (caused by 
overcrowding in camions or lack of water).83 While more substantial figures on the impact 
of current immigration policies on migrants’ lives in Libya are still missing, the data 
gathered so far suggest that the measures geared towards curbing irregular migration 
are likely to increase migrants’ vulnerability and the involvement of third parties due to the 
raise in profit to be made from smuggling activities.84  
The conditions of ‘illegality’ are however not produced only as a result of expulsions to 
or tightening of immigration control in Libya. While most of the attention so far has been 
paid to the implications of collective removals from Lampedusa to Libya, the fact that the 
majority of the irregular migrants and asylum seekers are transferred from Lampedusa 
CPTA to other Italian CPTAs went overlooked. This continuous detention follows the 
logic intrinsic to CPTAs’ constitution, namely that detention is indispensable to ensure an 
effective removal policy. The data that appeared in the report from Italian’s Audit Court 
undermine the argumentation that CPTAs are a key means for effective functioning of 
expulsions. The report shows in fact that out of 11883 irregular migrants detained in 
Italian CPTAs in 2004, less than half were deported while the rest escaped or were 
released after the expiration of the maximum detention period.85 Since the majority of 
migrants, after they have been served a removal order, are actually released from the 
                                                                                                                                            
holding regular jobs and some were holders of identity cards issued by private Libyan companies. See EC, 
ibid., p. 31-35.  
83 Libyan authorities confirmed that 106 migrants died during an expulsion operation in 2004. Basing his 
inquiry on the data from Red Crescent, Gatti claims that at least another 70 men and women died in the 
desert as result of unsafe conditions. Gatti, F. ibid., 2005b. 
84 On this topic see Koslowski, R. ‘Economic Globalization, Human Smuggling, and Global Governance’, in 
D. Kyle and R. Koslowski’ (eds.), Global Human Smuggling. Comparative Perspectives, Baltimore and 
London, The John Hopkins University Press, 2001, pp. 337-358. 
85 The exact percentage is 48,1. Quoted in the 2005 report by Corte dei Conti.  
http://www.corteconti.it/Ricerca-e-1/Gli-Atti-d/Controllo-/Documenti/Sezione-ce1/Anno-2005/Adunanza-c/
allegati-d3/Relazione.doc 
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CPTAs, scholars have suggested to view detention camps not as institutions geared 
towards deportations but rather as sites that on the one hand, function as filter 
mechanism for selective inclusion of certain groups of migrants and on the other, 
produce ‘illegality’ and hence the condition of ‘deportability’.86 This reasoning is of great 
relevance in particular for the asylum seekers transferred from Lampedusa CPTA to 
another Italian CPTA: asylum seekers’ detention becomes in fact mandatory only after 
they have been served a refusal of entry order in Lampedusa.87 Moreover, once released 
from a CPTA with the order to leave Italy, asylum seekers find themselves in an irregular 
situation: if they overstay the period of five days within which they must leave the country, 
they are susceptible to incarceration on the basis of having committed an offence by 
failing to observe the expulsion order.88   
As research has shown in several instances, border controls, detentions and 
expulsions practices do not prevent people from moving from their countries of origin nor 
from reaching Europe but rather they raise the costs and dangers of migration. The 
alarmist portrayals that invoke the image of a massive influx of undocumented entries 
from Libya to Italy hinder a correct understanding of existing migratory patterns and the 
responsibility of the states in reducing legal channels of migration and impeding access 
to asylum so that in contemporary times illegality has become a structural characteristic 
of migratory flows.89  
6 Renounced Responsibilities: the EU Framework 
Next to being a matter of Italy’s national legislation and initiative, the return of illegal 
third-country nationals from Lampedusa holding center and the collaboration with Libya 
on migration issues are also regulated by the EU framework. The EU directive on return 
and the Action Plan on Libya, both still to be finalized, are part of the agenda to establish 
a comprehensive Community policy on immigration and asylum. The EU return directive 
                                            
86 Karakayali, S. and V. Tsianos,‘Wilde Schafsjagd in Aigais und die transnationalen “mujahideen”. 
Rastanski Lojia Über Grenzregime an der Südostgrenze Europas’, Springerin n. 4, 2005; 
and Mezzadra, S. (ed), I confini della libertà. DeriveApprodi, Roma, 2004.  
87 A deportation order is served to those applicants whose application has been rejected. The applicant can 
appeal within 15 days but this does not suspend the deportation order even though the Prefetto might 
authorize the applicant to remain in Italy until the outcome in the appeal. In case, the applicant is deported 
before presenting the appeal, he/she has the right of appeal from abroad via Italian diplomatic 
representations.  
88 See International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), Italy. Right of Asylum in Italy: Access to 
procedures and treatment of asylum-seekers. Report. International Fact-finding Mission. No. 419/2, June 
2005, p. 19 
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provides a minimum set of procedural and legal safeguards for third-county nationals 
residing illegally in EU Member States concerning their return, removal and custody.90 
Once in force, the Directive’s prioritising of voluntary return over forced removal, 
providing for a right to an effective judicial remedy with suspensive effect against return 
decision and removal order, and limiting the use of temporary custody to the cases that 
present the risk of absconding would legally oblige the authorities of the Lampedusa 
holding center to revisit their removal practices in accordance with the standards set by 
the EU. However, it is very likely that the Directive will not affect the situation and 
procedures in Lampedusa given the fact that the Lampedusa holding center has a 
special status namely that of a clearing station.91 In fact, according to the Article 2.2. of 
the Return directive, the Member States are not obliged to apply the directive to the 
third-country nationals who have been refused entry in a transit zone of a Member State. 
Classifying Lampedusa holding center as a clearing station circumvents therefore the 
Return Directive and relieves Italian authorities from the obligation to bring the removal 
practices in Lampedusa in line with the common EU standards.92  
The discussions between the European Union and Libya as regards migration 
management have intensified throughout 2005 and are currently directed towards 
drawing a Joint Action Plan.93 Developed under the framework of the external dimension 
of the common European asylum and immigration policy laid out by the Hague program 
with the aim of integrating asylum into EU’s external relations with third countries, the 
cooperation between the EU and Libya is geared towards defining operational measures 
to counter illegal migration. The Joined Action Plan that is currently being drafted outlines 
inter alia the enhancement of  border control at Libya’s sea, southern land and air borders, 
                                                                                                                                            
89 Mezzadra, S. Diritto di fuga. Migrazioni, cittadinanza, globalizzazione, Verona, Ombre corte, 2001.  
90 European Commissions, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals.  
91 AI, Temporary stay – permanent rights. Ibid., Appendix 2.  
92 I thank Daphné Bouteillet-Paquet, JHA Executive Officer from Amnesty International EU Office for 
bringing this point to my attention.  
93 The history of discussion between EU and Libya goes as fellows: in November 2002, the Council 
considered it essential to initiate cooperation with Libya on migration. In May 2003, the Commission 
organized an exploratory mission to Libya to assess the interest of Libyan government in developing a 
cooperation. The Council decided, on 16 June 2003, to organize a follow up technical mission. Postponed 
until the Council agreed on 11 October 2004 to embark upon a policy of engagement with Libya, the 
technical mission was carried out between 28 November and 6 December 2004. On the basis of the 
recommendations contained in the report of the technical mission released in April 2005, draft operational 
Council conclusions were drawn and later discussed by the High Level Group on Asylum and Migration in 
20 May, by the JHA Counsellors on 23 May, and by the Permanent Representatives Committee on 26 May 
2005. The outcome of this process is the draft Council conclusions on initiating dialogue and cooperation 
with Libya on migration issues (9413/1/05 REV 1). Many of the measures outlined in the Annex are taken 
up by the Libya-EU Joint Action Plan that at this point is still being drafted and therefore not public.  
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training of Libyan law enforcement officers including thematic program on asylum, 
refurbishment of detention camps and dialogue with main countries of origin as main 
components of EU-Libyan partnership.94 Given the fact that Libya does not have a 
functioning asylum system in place and that it is not party to the Geneva Convention, the 
Action Plan proposes as far as detention centers are concerned to limit EU’s intervention 
to the provision of health care and advice and postpone assistance for return operations 
until conditionality requirements ensuring adequate protection of refugees are met by 
Libya.95  
Despite the evidence of grave human rights violations in Libya suggesting that Libya 
falls short of conditionality requirements and prior to EU’s outlining the conditions for the 
formalized cooperation in the field of return, Italy financed construction of detention 
camps in Libya and a program of charter flights for the repatriation of illegal migrants from 
Libya. In funding the construction of detention camps and carrying out of repatriation 
flights in Libya, Italy circumventing of EU’s framework on immigration and asylum. This 
however does not exempt EU from its responsibilities on the matter. The EU return 
directive and the Action Plan on Libya are both new instruments and both need yet to be 
finalized. Despite ample evidence of procedural irregularities and allegations of collective 
expulsions from Lampedusa holding center, the Commission’s Proposal for a Return 
directive gives Member States the possibility not to apply the Directive in transit zones. In 
a similar manner, the EU went ahead to develop cooperation on irregular migration with 
Libya despite evidence of grave human rights violations in Libya, no guarantee of refugee 
rights in Libya and no official recognition of UNHCR protection mandate. Moreover, while 
the draft of the Action Plan specifies that no EU funding will be provided for return until 
the conditionality requirements are met, it does not mention any limitations to be imposed 
on bilateral agreements on return such as the one between Italy and Libya.  
The EU return directive and the Action Plan both strengthen Member States’ 
discretion and leave ample space for the states, in this case Italy, to apply the 
exception. 96  The wide discretion for application of restrictive exceptions and 
                                            
94 The Joint Action Plan is still in it draft form. Nevertheless, the combined information for the Action Plan 
(draft as at September 2005) and the Draft Council Conclusions on initiating dialogue and cooperation with 
Libya on migration issues (9413/1/05 REV 1) offer an outline of the main points and suggest the priorities 
likely to be included in the final Action Plan.  
95 In accordance with the Council conclusions in November 2004, any cooperation is conditional upon full 
respect for human rights, respect for democratic principles, the rule of law and the demonstration by those 
countries of a genuine commitment to fulfil international obligations towards refugees.  
96 Thierry Balzacq and Sergio Carrera identify large margin of exception as one of the reasons for low 
convergence of Communitarian policies on migration, borders and asylum. In Balzacq, T. and S. Carrera. 
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Commission’s position in case of Lampedusa that Italy’s compliance with its international 
obligations is a matter not to be decided by the Commission but by Italy under its national 
law undermines the credibility of Commissions’ monitoring responsibility and EU’s 
commitment to protect refugees.  
The issue of Commissions’ responsibility as far as the right of asylum is concerned is 
further raised by its co-financing of the TRIM program in Libya.97 Under the TRIM 
Program, developed and implemented by the IOM, the Commission is funding IOM to 
improve the services and conditions of detention for irregular migrants in detention 
centers in Libya,98 develop a so-called Assisted Voluntary Return Program (AVR) and 
Reinsertion program for irregular migrants in Libya to return to their countries of origin, 
and strengthen cooperation on irregular migration between origin and destination 
countries.99 Contrary to its commitment not to financially assist Libya with repatriations, 
via its collaboration with the IOM the Commission is de facto funding a return scheme for 
repatriation of irregular migrants and asylum seekers from Libya. Similar to Italy’s 
expulsion of irregular migrants and asylum seekers to Libya and Libya’s delegation of 
detention and repatriations matter to IOM, the Commission also contracts out to IOM its 
responsibility over migration and asylum matters. Yet, contracting out the responsibility 
for detention conditions and repatriations to IOM, does not relieve the EU, Italy or Libya 
from their international legal obligations under norms prohibiting refoulement and norms 
protecting human rights.100  
Contracting out also raises the question of responsibility as regards IOM’s 
interventions. In case of repatriation of those irregular migrant and asylum seekers who 
have initially been expelled from Lampedusa holding center, IOM makes itself complicit 
                                                                                                                                            
Migration, Borders and Asylum. Trends and Vulnerabilities in EU Policy. CEPS: Brussels, 2005. 
97 A sum of 2.000.000,00 EUR has been allocated by the Commission under the 2004 budget for the 
AENEAS Programme. See Annex 1 of the Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and Council. Thematic Programme for the cooperation with third countries in the area of 
migration and asylum. COM(206) 26 final dated 25 January 2006. 
98 The degree of IOM’s involvement with detention camps in Libya remains to be seen. IOM’s involvement 
with the matter of reception centres in the north Africa dates back to 2002 when IOM, UNHCR, the 
European Commission, the Netherlands and Denmark met in an informal meeting to discuss the UK 
proposal for ‘in the region and off-shore processing’ and drafted a memorandum that set a number of 
practical, legal and financial issues concerning the external processing. IOM has already managed 
off-shore processing detention centres, such as the one set by the Australian authorities on Nauru island, 
for which it came under attack by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, and urged to stop 
arbitrary detention and impingement of migrants’ right to seek asylum.  IOM is currently also responsible for 
realization of two large new camps for irregular migrants in Ukraine, one of the potential countries to host 
EU’s Regional Protection Programme. 
99 EC, ibid., p. 15. 
100 Even though Libya is not a signatory of 1951 Geneva Convention, Libya has ratified the respective 1969 
OAU Convention on protection on refugees.  
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in obstructing asylum seekers’ right to asylum. Moreover, the fact that irregular migrants 
and asylum seekers are deported from Lampedusa without knowing that they are being 
transferred to Libya, that the removals are executed by force and that once in Libya 
migrants are again detained in police-guarded structures, raises serious doubts that the 
IOM-run repatriations from Libya can be identified as voluntary. When the decisions to 
return are made under duress or as an alternative to state-run forced expulsions, 
‘voluntary’ seems to designate an absence of viable options rather than a deliberate 
choice. IOM cannot be held responsible for the rule of law in the same way as sovereign 
states. However, in deporting irregular migrants and asylum seekers from Libya IOM is to 
be seen as assuming joint responsibility for any violation of fundamental rights asylum 
seekers and irregular migrants might suffer. 
7 Conclusions 
In the attempt to control the influx of ‘irregular’ migrants and asylum seekers to Italy 
via Libya, Italian developed a number of schemes within and beyond its state borders. In 
the holding center situated on the island of Lampedusa, Italy’s southernmost island and 
the most frequent point of arrival in 2004 for boats departing from Libya, Italian authorities 
implemented detention and large-scale expulsion schemes that according to the NGOs 
affected irregular migrants and asylum seekers alike. In order to control the migratory 
flows prior to migrants’ reaching its territory, Italy strengthened its collaboration on illegal 
migration with Libya through signing a readmission agreement and proving funding for 
the refurbishment of several detention facilities and for a program of flights repatriating 
irregular migrants in Libya to their countries of origin. Libya on its part increased internal 
checks on specific groups of migrants, in particular those originating from Sub-Saharan 
states, leading often to arbitrary detentions and unsafe repatriations in which more than 
hundred people lost their lives.  
Despite Italian Government’s denial that any human rights violations are taking place 
in Lampedusa holding center, the European Parliament and the United Nations’ Human 
Rights Committee (UNHRC) expressed concern about the conditions of detention in 
Lampedusa center. The EP’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs 
(LIBE) visited the Lampedusa holding center in September 2005 as to assess the 
detention conditions, the running of the CPTA and the treatment of migrants. Both 
European Parliament and UNHRC called on Italy to guarantee the individual examination 
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of asylum and refrain from collective expulsions of undocumented migrants and asylum 
seekers to Libya. European Parliament stated that these expulsions constitute the 
violation of the principle of non-refoulement that prohibits the forcible return of anyone to 
the territory where they might be at risk of serious human rights violations. To expel 
asylum seekers from Italy to Libya implies returning them to a country which does not 
recognize the mandate of the UNHCR, has no asylum system, and is not a signatory of 
the Geneva Convention and in which, as NGOs documented, irregular migrants and 
asylum seekers are at risk of arbitrary detentions, unfair trails, disappearance and torture 
while in detention. 
The procedural and legal safeguards for the return, removal and custody of 
third-county nationals residing illegally in EU Member States and the collaboration with 
Libya on matters of illegal migration are outlined by the EU return directive and by the 
Libya-EU Joint Action Plan. The Directive prioritizes voluntary to forced return, introduces 
the suspension against a return decision and/or a removal order, and limits temporary 
custody to those situations with the risk of absconding. The Action Plan, on the other 
hand, proposes to postpone EU’s assistance for return schemes for undocumented 
migrants in Libya until the Libyan Government demonstrates full respect for human rights 
and democratic principles and the commitment to fulfil its international obligation towards 
refugees.  
Potentially instruments that would oblige Italian authorities to revisit their detention 
and removal practices, the EU return directive and the Action Plan –both still to be 
finalized-- leave at this stage too ample space for the Member States to apply restrictive 
exceptions and to develop bilateral partnerships. Since the directive exempts the 
Member States from applying the minimum procedural and legal safeguards for the 
return, removal and custody to a transit zone, Italian authorities do not hold the obligation 
to revisit their removal practices in the Lampedusa holding center as to bring them in line 
with the common EU standards on return. Similarly, the scope of Member States’ 
interventions regarding funding of return schemes for irregular migrants in Libya is not 
contemplated by the Action Plan which hence imposes no limitations on repatriation 
programs for the of irregular migrants in Libya, such as those funded by Italy in 2003 and 
2004. Wide powers left to the Member States to apply exception and develop bilateral 
partnerships in combination to the funding allocated to the IOM for a program geared 
inter alia towards developing a repatriation scheme in Libya, undermines EU’s efforts to 
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achieve a common framework on asylum and immigration and its credibility on refugee 
protection. 
Scholars and policy analyst have approached the issue of detention and repatriation 
programs outside EU borders in terms of externalization of asylum. What this paper 
suggests however is that the implementation of detention and repatriation programs in 
Libya, especially when these are considered together with the expulsions from 
Lampedusa, does not actually relocate the asylum procedures outside the EU external 
borders but rather deprives asylum seekers of the possibility to access the asylum 
determination procedure. This violation of the right to asylum is concealed by the imagery 
invoked by politicians and mass media of a mass arrival of undocumented migrants from 
Libya to the Italian shores. This imagery distorts the reality of migratory movements from 
Sub-Saharan Africa into Libya, an established part of Libya’s seasonal labor migration 
rather than a source of irregular migration into Europe. Next to producing an erroneous 
representation of migratory flows in the Mediterranean region, the imagery of a mass 
arrival conceals also Italy’s reluctance to admit asylum seekers into its territory and its 
unwillingness to assume its share of asylum responsibility in the EU.  
Current Italian-Libyan partnership indicates a new reorientation of Libyan politics from 
a pro-African to a pro-European politics. This change in political balances, accompanied 
by Libya’s tightening of border controls towards its Sub-Saharan neighbors, is likely to 
clash with the principle of free movement of people as one of the cornerstones of the 
regional cooperation and integration of the Sahel-Saharan region, and might destabilize 
the current political balances between Libya and the neighboring states and 
consequently illegalize movements of large groups of Sub-Saharan nationals. 
The implementation of detention and expulsion schemes that illegalize migratory 
movements and impinge migrants’ right to seek asylum raise the issue of political 
responsibility of all actors involved whether they are Governments, supranational bodies 
or agencies. No actor can be exempt from responsibility for violation of the right to asylum, 
of the non-refoulement principle and of the prohibition of collective expulsions. The Italian 
and Libyan governments, the European Union, and the International Organization for 
Migration all need to assume their share of responsibility for violation of rights that asylum 
seekers and irregular migrants might suffer as a result of measures and programs they 
implement inside the EU and outside its borders. 
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8 Policy Recommendations  
Given the fact that data available on measures regarding detention and deportations 
of irregular migrants and asylum seekers in Lampedusa and Libya are often contradictory 
and incomplete, that bilateral agreements on irregular migration remain undisclosed and 
that the European Union’s framework leaves large discretion for the Member States to 
apply restrictive exceptions, this paper recommends transparency, accountability and 
legitimacy as key principles to guide Member States agenda and EU’s partnership with 
neighboring states in the field of asylum, borders and immigration.  
 
Transparency:  
A correct assessment on the situation regarding detention, expulsion and asylum at 
EU’s southern border is contingent upon having access and rendering transparent 
information, programs and agreements that regulate repatriations of irregular migrants 
and asylum seekers in Lampedusa and Libya. Whether carried out by the Italian and 
Libyan states or by the IOM, the lack of transparency is common to the policies and 
schemes aimed at countering irregular migration from and into Libya. To make public the 
information about number, frequency and destination of the return flights from 
Lampedusa CPTA, the content of the bilateral agreement between Italy and Libya and 
between Libya and IOM, as well as the contract for the TRIM Program co-funded by the 
EC is crucial for achieving a transparent Community policy on asylum and immigration. 
 
Accountability: 
With regards to the partnership with third countries in the area of migration and 
asylum, the EU must provide leadership in terms of human rights protection. The 
divergent interests between national and EU competences over borders, asylum and 
immigration should not leave member states with ample space to apply the exception 
that, as in case of the EU return directive, would result in the disregard even of the 
minimum safeguards on return. In case the EU or states contract the IOM this does not 
the EU, Italy or Libya from their international legal obligations under norms prohibiting 
refoulement and norms protecting human rights. Even though IOM cannot be held 
responsible for the rule of law in the same way as sovereign states, it must assure that its 
programs do not impinge on the right to seek asylum and must be held accountable for 
any violations that might occur as result of its actions.  
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The lack of safeguards and control mechanisms ensuring the right to seek asylum 
and Italy’s tendency to shift its responsibilities on matters of asylum requires an 
intervention from the side of the European Parliament. With the co-decision on asylum 
and immigration, the EP is directly involved in the decision-making process and needs to 
propose amendments to the Return Directive and the Action Plan on Libya with the 
objective to achieve observance of human rights and international standards. In the 
absence of any EU monitoring mechanism in Libya, the EP should urgently visit those 
detention centers in Libya where implementation of detention and repatriation is funded 
through the EU and member states schemes. The EP’s intervention would play a crucial 
role in achieving a transparent and democratic procedure as regards to a common 
asylum policy and would steer it towards a rights rather than control-based approach. 
 
Legitimacy: 
Holding centers are instruments aimed at facilitating an effective repatriation of 
third-country nationals who have entered Italy illegally. Lampedusa holding center does 
not fulfil that objective since approximately only a tenth of detainees are repatriated. It 
falls short of providing initial assistance to irregular migrants and asylum seekers. On the 
contrary, migrants seem to be held in degrading conditions, deprived of access to proper 
legal and heath assistance and exposed to abuse. In order to ensure that detention 
procedures and practices are in conformity with the existing domestic and international 
standards, a short-term objective is to mandate an independent monitoring body to make 
regular, unrestricted and unannounced visits to Lampedusa holding center. The closure 
of Lampedusa holding center should constitute a long-term objective.101 Lampedusa 
holding center does not fulfil its main functions: it facilitates only a nominal amount of 
expulsions and it perpetuates ill treatment rather than offer assistance. More importantly, 
due to Lampedusa’s classification as a clearing station, Italy is likely to disregard the set 
of minimum procedural and legal safeguards on return, removal and custody provided 
under the EU return directive. The closure of the Lampedusa holding center would 
                                            
101 This stance is also supported by the majority of Italy’s Regions where the camps are located. In summer 
2005, fourteen Provincial Governors and their representatives met at the forum Mare Aperto in Bari and 
drafted a document in which they commit to launching a political-institutional dialogue geared towards 
changing current Italian immigration law, closing the CPTAs, creating a comprehensive law on asylum, and 
doing away with the administrative detention. The position taken by the Provincial Governors gave rise in 
Italy to an institutional contradiction regarding the detention centres for undocumented migrants and as 
such constitutes a unique event in Europe of this kind. The final document is available at 
http://www.meltingpot.org/articolo5676.html  
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prevent future violation of procedures and assure that migrants and asylum seekers 
rights are not sidestepped by the Italian authorities. 
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